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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of income inequality on the property crime by testing its 
effect using pooled mean group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). Income 
inequality is specifically seen as the most noticeable feature of a bigger and more complex 
issue; less than 10 percent of the wealth in developed and developing countries is controlled 
by the poorest.  Data from 14 emerging countries in the Southern and Eastern European 
regions were used to test and extend the income inequality and crime hypothesis. Variables 
such as the rule of law, unemployment, and education were also employed to examine their 
effects on property crime rate. The findings confirmed that the income inequality is positively 
associated with property crime rate. The rule of law, unemployment, and level of education 
also revealed a meaningful relationship with property crime rate in these regions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
High crime rate in a country will have a negative effect on the quality of life of the residents of that country. This 
study focuses on property crime, with an emphasis on burglary and theft crime. The notable reasons for 
committing this type of crime are unemployment and poverty. High levels of unemployment and poverty can be 
found in the area in which the rate of income inequality is high. During the past few decades, globalization, while 
reducing cross-country income inequality, has increased within-country inequality since near-term rapid 
economic growth generates greater income inequality.  Trade liberalization, therefore, has shifted the economic 
inequality from a global to a domestic scale, increasing the risk of a more momentous impact of inequality on 
crime (Bhalla, 2002). It is, therefore, pertinent to mention here that the issue of inequality and the aspects related 
to it are anything but new with regard to the discourse about the causes of crime. The issue has been dealt with 
from various points of view since the nineteenth century. However, two main approaches to this issue have 
dominated the social sciences scenario over the past decades. The first approach is socio-cultural that follows 
Merton's seminal study on anomie and relative deprivation (1949). The second approach is the so-called 
economic rational choice theory of crime addressed in Becker's (1968) and Ehrlich's (1974) works. These 
approaches are explained in the literature section of this paper. 
Societies or communities with high level of income inequality tend to have more fear of crime than 
societies with less inequality of income (Vauclair & Bratanova, 2016). The Gini index, which is also known as 
the Gini coefficient, is the most prominent measure of income inequality. As of 2013, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey, and Greece had the highest income disparity in Europe, the richest 10 percent in Bulgaria earned about 
13.69 times more than the poorest 10 percent, in Romania it was 14.55 while in Greece it was 15.36 ( Eurostat, 
2013).  The Gini coefficients in Turkey as of 2013 was 0.43, which was rather high, Bulgaria had 0.35, Greece 
had 0.344, and Portugal recorded 0.342. The average Gini index for the 14 sampled countries of this study as of 
2014 was 0.34 (Eurostat, 2016). The income inequality can have both direct and indirect effects on the economic 
growth; the indirect effect of inequality on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita comes as a result of the 
positive impact it has on the crime rate. During this period under study, in this particular regions, the property 
crime became common, especially burglary and theft crimes, which covers about 83 percent of the total crime 
(Eurostat, 2016). In the EU-28, the domestic burglary has increased by 14 percent between 2007 and 2012 
(Eurostat, 2014). Greece has recorded the highest increase in the number of domestic burglary by 76 percent, 
Spain recorded an increase of 74 percent in domestic burglary, Italy had 42 percent, Romania with 41 percent, 
and Croatia 40 percent. On the contrary, huge reductions in this category of crime were recorded only by 
Lithuania and Slovakia with -36 percent and -29 percent, respectively (Eurostat, 2014). The European 
Commission defines domestic burglary as gaining access to another person’s dwelling by force in order to steal 
properties. The United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in 2011 that the property crime 
rate is expected to increase across European countries in the coming years.  
As stated earlier, the income inequality leads to high crime rate, the crime, in turn, affects the growth of an 
economy (Kumar, 2013; Detotto & Otranto, 2010). Over the period of 2008-2013, most European countries have 
recorded an increase in the rate of property crime. For instance, according to Eurostat (2015), Romania has 
recorded an increase in the rate of total property crime (rate per 100,000 inhabitants), from 46.3 in 2008 to 129 in 
2014. Sweden, despite a Nordic and a developed country, recorded the rate of 193.23 per 100,000 populations in 
2008 as the number of victims of property crime; the rate kept increasing through 2014 with the number of 
victims around 434. Bulgaria recorded 504.56 victims per 100,000 populations in 2008, while in 2014 a number 
of 622 victims was recorded. Countries like Italy, Slovenia, Spain, among others, have also recorded a rise in the 
rate of property crime. What is then the reason behind the rising number of property crime victims in Europe?  
In 1992, the general strain theory developed by Robert Agnew was written at the social psychological 
levels, which focuses on the individual and his immediate environment incorporating the argument of the strain 
theory by Merton (1938). The theory categorizes strains under three main categories: strain as the failure to 
achieve positively valued goals, strain as the removal of positively valued stimuli from the individual and, lastly, 
strain in response to the presentation of negative stimuli (Agnew, 1992). The theory, thus, suggests that there is a 
possible correlation between the income inequality and crime rate as a way of seeking revenge against the 
negative stimuli such as inequality among households and individuals. The general strain theory has been 
considered to be a solid theory and has attracted a significant amount of empirical evidence.  
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Both developed and emerging European countries face the problem of income disparity among their 
citizens. The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) decries the increasing income 
inequality stating that the top income earners in the developed countries earn almost 10 times more than those at 
the bottom of the income scale, not to mention even greater disparities in the emerging countries (OECD, 2015). 
This explains why most of the European developed countries have been experiencing this problem. Fredriksen 
(2012) argued that the main reasons behind the increase in income dispersion in Europe in recent years are the 
EU enlargement and the large income gains among the top 10 percent within the core of eight European 
countries. These two reasons are attributed to a number of factors such as skill-biased technological change, 
deregulation of financial sector, globalization of financial operation, and offshoring of businesses among others 
(European Union, 2014).  
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of income inequality on property crime in 14 Southern 
and Eastern European countries. These countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. The remainder of this paper is 
drafted as follows: section 2 reviews the related literature, section 3 addresses the method used, the results of our 
findings are presented in section 4 and finally, section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The socio-cultural approach that follows Merton's seminal study on anomie and relative deprivation (1949) 
argues that, in some societies, lower classes are particularly driven to crime because — though influenced by the 
universal goal of economic success — they have scarce access to the legitimate means leading to such success. 
Within this approach, inequality, unemployment, etc., are taken into consideration because they are part and 
parcel of the above-mentioned scarce access to legitimate means. However, this approach posits that inequality, 
poverty, and unemployment trigger crime propensity only in so far as they are associated with a culture that 
regards economic success as a universal goal, regardless the original status of the individual. In other words, the 
premises of this approach are social and cultural, rather than just economic. This approach has been blamed for 
being often unable to translate its rich socio-cultural considerations of qualitative character into falsifiable results 
by means of a quantitative analysis. However, there are also appreciable quantitative analyses of the inequality-
crime link using the anomie approach. The standard reference work is by Blau and Blau (1982) who found that, 
in the 125 largest metropolitan areas of the US, both poverty and economic inequality increase rates of criminal 
violence; but once the economic inequalities are controlled, the poverty no longer influences these rates. Later 
works include Savolainen (2000) that analyzed income inequality and crime in two sets of countries; Bjerregaard 
and Cochran (2008) that analyzed income inequality and homicide rates in 49 countries, and Dahlberg and 
Gustavsson (2008) that distinguished between permanent and temporary inequality as crime determinants. 
The so-called economic rational choice theory of crime, which following Becker's (1968) and Ehrlich's 
(1974) pioneering studies, assumes that crime is a rational option whenever its benefit outweighs its cost. Crime 
costs and benefits, in turn, are influenced by economic conditions that affect both legitimate opportunities 
(supply) and returns to crime (demand). Becker and Ehrlich tried to show that the crime propensity is the result of 
a choice based on calculations regarding, on the one hand, unfavorable economic conditions (measured by 
unemployment, low average income, share of people with income below one-half of the median income, Gini 
index etc.) that translate into crime benefits for the offenders and, on the other hand, costs met by the offenders 
(e.g. punishment, measured as the average time spent by offenders in prison). This approach is against any 
cultural and social interpretation because it suggests that the homo economicus is the same in any society and 
culture and is moved everywhere only by economic considerations of costs and benefits. On this basis, the 
economic approach tends to underestimate the social and cultural differences behind costs and benefits while it 
privileges the use of rather sophisticated econometric analyses in order to predict the crime propensity by means 
of the said costs and benefits for the offenders. 
Few others have found positive effects; Imrohoroglu et al. (2000) have utilized the data of crimes in the 
United States using the general equilibrium model and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to examine the 
relationship between income distribution and crimes in the United States. The fact is that most crimes (property 
and violent crimes) are committed by the less privileged citizens of the society. These citizens or members of the 
society face greater pressures and enticements to commit crime in the areas of high inequality. Fajnzylber et al. 
(2002) have concluded that the income inequality has a significant and positive effect on the incidence of crime.  
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Sharma (2011) pointed out that the inequality increases most types of property and violent crimes in India. 
Carvalho and Carvalho and Lavor (2008) revealed that the increasing inequality in Brazil leads to more 
victimization. It has long been recognized by criminologists that victimization is an important perspective to 
understand crime. Bourguignon et al. (2003), using a simple theoretical model and panel data in seven cities of 
Columbia, suggested that a group of population which most matters for time fluctuations in the crime rate are 
those people whose income per capita lies below 80 percent of the mean of the population. Stucky et al. (2016) 
have found that lower levels of neighborhood income is associated with higher violent and property crime in the 
state of Indiana, United States. Enamorado et al. (2016) have also found that during Mexico’s drug war, the 
income inequality increases drug-related homicides in the country. Coccia (2017) revealed that the 
socioeconomic inequality induces high rates of intentional homicides in society. Buttrick and Oishi (2017) argued 
that living in highly unequal regimes is associated with both increased mistrust and increased anxiety about social 
status. A study by Ishak and Bani (2017) also revealed that GDP per capita, unemployment, and population 
density determine the property crime in four developed states in Malaysia. 
Moreover, these few studies were not on a panel of European countries except that of Vauclair and 
Bratanova (2016) that studied the relationship between income inequality and the fear of crime. They found that 
people living in a society with more inequality of income are fearful of crime. They used data from the European 
Social Survey (ESS) and adopted a more general view on the fear of crime by examining its antecedents at 
multiple levels of analysis as well as its psychological consequence. The study can be distinguished regarding its 
explanation on the factors considered as having association with the fear of crime. Thus, the aim of this study is 
to examine the impact of income inequality on property crime in a panel of 14 selected Southern and Eastern 
European countries.  
The major literature gaps found by this study are the inability of the previous studies to include the rule of 
law and the interaction of the rule of law and income inequality in estimating the relationships. Moreover, 
previous studies on the relationship between income inequality and crime in Europe were mainly time-series 
studies on Germany (Entorf and Spengler, 2002) and Sweden (Nilsson, 2004), the other is on a panel of 
municipals in Finland (Huhta, 2012) which used GMM analysis. On the other hand, a panel survey study was 
conducted by Vauclair and Bratanova (2016) on Europe in which the study used ―fear of crime‖ (as dependent 
variable) instead of crime or property crime. The functions of the current study is to incorporate the rule of law, 
interacts it with income inequality in an interactive equation, focus on the Southern and Eastern European 
countries and apply the pooled mean group (PMG) technique. The study will, therefore, be different from other 
previous studies in terms of the variables used, the estimation technique as well as the area or scope of the study. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In achieving the objectives of this study, the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. 
(1999) was used on pooled cross-country time series data to examine the effect of income inequality on property 
crime in 14 selected Southern and Eastern European countries. We intended to focus on these countries because 
most of the countries are emerging ones and are characterized by fast economic growth. In addition, fast 
economic growth is expected to be associated immediately with increasing inequality and only later with 
decreasing inequality. In other words, emerging countries are of particular interest to the issue of inequality 
because they are expected to confirm the inverted U curve, which should characterize the relationship between 
economic growth and income inequality: an aspect discovered by Simon Kuznets and presented in a well-known 
paper published more than 60 years ago (Kuznets, S. 1955. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality", 
American Economic Review 45(1):1-28). Although all of the selected countries could hardly be described as 
"emerging countries", we found that these countries (excluding Italy and Spain) are characterized by intermediate 
income, brisk economic growth, institutional transformations, and economic opening. 
Other variables like the rule of law, unemployment, educational level, and immigrant status were included 
in the study. The income inequality data and the data for the control variables, except for immigrants, were taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) while the data on property crime and immigrants 
were taken from the Eurostat database. All data are annual and covered the period from 1993 to 2014. A panel 
unit root test of stationary is conducted first, followed by the panel cointegration and then the main PMG 
estimator, which assumed homogeneous long run parameters but assumed  dynamic  in the  short run parameters  
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and later the error variance is calculated. The authors used the rule of law – in lieu of some measures of 
punishment, which is a common option in crime analysis following the economic rational choice theory of crime 
– as crime cost. The rule of law is expected here to counterbalance the pressure to committing crime exerted by 
inequality. The data for the rule of law was collected from the World Bank’s WGI. Therefore, ―the rule of law" is 
an estimation of the consistency of the action of the justice system in the various countries. The variable, 
unemployment has been used to proxy economic conditions in the whole population, both unemployed and 
employed (Cantor and Land, 2001; Phillips and Land, 2012). Research works have suggested, moreover, that 
unemployment could be a better indicator of social malaise than the low income and inequality itself due to the 
fact that it implies also the loss of a meaningful role in a society (Hooghe et al., 2010). 
 
Panel Unit root test 
This study conducted three types of panel unit root tests; Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003) and ADF Fisher test 
by Maddala and Wu (1999) in which all three assume a null hypothesis of non-stationary. Moreover, the tests are 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test generalization from a single time series to panel data (Baltagi et al., 2005). 
Recent research works suggest that panel unit root tests have higher power than unit root tests based on 
individual time series. They are generally called the panel unit tests but theoretically, they are basically known as 
the multiple series unit root tests applied to panel data structures in which the presence of cross sections generates 
multiple series out of a single series, (Baltagi et al., 2005). Tests of panel unit root may be similar, however, not 
necessarily identical with the tests of single series unit root. On the basis of whether there are restrictions on the 
autoregressive (AR) process across cross-sections, we will have the following AR(1) process of panel data: 
 
                      (1) 
 
where   = 1, 2, …., N cross-section unit observed over period,   = 1, 2, …., T. 
The     represents the exogenous variables in the model including any fixed effects or individual trends,    are 
the autoregressive coefficients, and the errors     are assumed to be mutually independent idiosyncratic 
disturbances. If |  |   1,    is said to be softly stationary. If on the other hand, |  | = 1, then    contains a unit 
root. Moreover, two natural assumptions for testing purposes can be made about the   ; the assumption that the 
persistence parameters are common across cross-section so that    =   for all  , Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test 
employs this assumption. If on the other hand,    can vary freely across cross-section, then the assumption 
conforms to that of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and ADF Fisher proposed by Maddala-Wu (1999). 
 
Panel cointegration test 
The panel cointegration technique has also been applied to test the presence of long run relationship among 
integrated variables. The precondition for testing panel cointegration is that all variables under study must be 
integrated of order one, I(1), (Pedroni, 1999). This means that the variables should be non-stationary at level, 
I(0). According to Pedroni (1999), the panel cointegration statistics support the version of weak PPP hypothesis. 
In a general form, the following regression model will be considered. 
 
                           (2) 
 
where   = 1, 2, …., N and   = 1, 2, …., T. 
    is a vector for each member  , here, we refer to scalar case,    , to simplify the notation and show any 
condition in which generalizations are not immediate to the vector case (Pedroni, 1999). So, the variables     and 
    (dependent and independent variables) are assumed to be integrated of order one, I(1), for each member   of 
the panel and under null of no cointegration, the residual     will also be I(1). Hence, the (1) is referred to as a 
spurious regression. The parameters    and    allow the possibility of member specific fixed effects and 
deterministic trends respectively, while the parameter    permits the possibility of common effects that are shared 
across individual members of the panel in any given period. In general, the slope coefficient    will be permitted  
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to vary by individual, though, in a case where it takes on a common value,    =   for all members will also be 
considered. 
 
Pooled mean group (PMG) estimator 
The pooled mean group entails the pooling and averaging of parameters. It is, therefore, an intermediate 
estimator. The PMG restricts long run parameters but allows error variance, short-run coefficients, and intercepts 
to vary. This is because pooled mean group allows dynamic specification; it assumes weak homogeneity of 
parameters across countries, the PMG permits dynamic specification (including the lags order) to be different 
across countries. The PMG estimator examines the long run correlation among variables across countries by not 
striking homogeneity of short run parameters based on autoregressive distributed lag system (Pesaran et al., 
1999).  
The estimation method of PMG occupies position in between the MG and the dynamic fixed effects 
(DFE); the DFE restricts slope coefficients but allows intercepts to differ across countries. The PMG has the lead 
to estimate long and short run dynamic relationships in a cross-sectional dynamic heterogeneous panel data. For 
example, given the unrestricted ARDL (p,         specification for dynamic panel model: 
    ∑   
 
   
       ∑ ̇  
 
   
              (3) 
 
where t = 1, 2, …., T, is the time period; i = 1, 2, …., N, is the number of countries,     is the (k x 1) vector of 
explanatory variables for a country i;     are the (k x 1) coefficient vectors;     are scalars and    represents 
country fixed effects. The model above can be re-parameterized as a VECM system. 
 
       (        ̇    )  ∑           ∑ ̇                
   
   
   
   
 (4) 
where       ∑        
 
    ∑     
 
        ∑                     
 
         
 ∑                     
 
      
The long run parameter for a country given by    and    is the equilibrium or error correction parameter. 
When    , it indicates the non-presence of relationship among variables in the long run. The expected sign of 
parameter is to be negative and significant to insinuate the speed of adjustment or convergence to long run 
equilibrium. The PMG estimator restricts the element of   to be identical across countries under the following 
assumptions: 
 
    are independently distributed across i and t, with mean 0, variances   
     and finite fourth-order moments. 
They are also distributed independently of the regressors    . The assumption of independence between the 
disturbances and the regressors is required for consistent estimation of the short run parameters. 
 
The ARDL (         model (4) is stable; the roots of ∑     
        lie outside the unit cycle. The 
assumption requires that       which implies the existence of a long run relationship between     and     
described by      (
 ̇ 
  
)         where     is a stationary process. This assumption also ensures that the order 
of integration of     is at most equal to that of    . 
For the long run homogeneity, the long run parameters defined            are the same across the 
countries, namely    and    i = 1, 2, ….N. Both the country-specific short run parameters and the common long 
run coefficients are computed by a maximum likelihood estimation. The parameters of interest are the long run 
effect and adjustment coefficients. The PMG estimator produces consistent estimates of parameters that are 
asymptotically normal for both stationary and non-stationary I(1) regressors (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
 
The model 
Based on the inequality and crime theory and as recommended by Neumayer (2005), the basic model for this 
study is as follows: 
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                                                      (5) 
 
where Cr is property crime rate, Inq is income inequality, RGDPC is real GDP per capita, Ue is unemployment 
rate, Imgr is percentage of immigrants to total population, Edu is education level, and    is the error term. The 
variable level of education is included following a study by Huhta (2012) who integrated the variable into his 
model. 
The same way as North (1991) conceptualizes good institutional quality as a device that organizes 
socioeconomic and political interaction, this study, therefore, includes the rule of law as a measure for 
institutional quality to examine the relationship between rule of law and property crime rate. We feature the rule 
of law in equation (6) below: 
                                                              (6) 
 
In the equation (6) above, the sign of    is expected to be positive to indicate that the high property crime 
is associated with the rising income inequality, while the coefficient of    is expected to be negative indicating 
that a better quality of rule of law reduces the property crime rate (Neumayer, 2005, Neumayer, 2003). The    is 
also expected to be negative, which means that when the real GDP per capita increases, this will lower the crime 
rate (Neumayer, 2003). The signs of    and    are expected to have a positive relationship with the crime rate; 
this is because the high percentage of immigrants and unemployment rate are said to have an association with the 
high crime rate (Huhta, 2012). The last coefficient    is expected to have a negative sign to show that higher 
level of education among individuals lowers the level of crime rate (Brilli & Tonello, 2014). 
If we consider relating the inequality of income and the quality of institutions, we accept the remark given 
by Chong and Gradstein (2004) that a significant relationship between income inequality and institutional 
weakness exists. In order to include this into our model, we create an interactive equation so as to examine the 
interaction of rule of law with the income inequality on crime. To do so, we transform equation (6) to have an 
interactive equation (7) as in the work of Brambor et al. (2006). This is to explain deeper on the effect of income 
inequality on the property crime rate.  
 
                                                                       
     
(7) 
 
i = 1, 2, …., N  t = 1, 2, …., T 
 
In equation (7) above,    and    will be interpreted, this is because according to Brambor et al. (2006), it 
is proper to have a positive/negative and significant coefficient of    and   , hence, the rule of law as the 
mediator is expected to reduce the effect of income inequality on the crime rate. Therefore,    is expected to be 
marginally positive. The real GDP per capita growth (    is expected to be negatively associated with lower 
crime rate. The signs of    and    are expected to be positive to show that high percentage of immigrants and 
unemployment rates induce the crime rate (Huhta, 2012). The sign of    is to be negative to show that higher 
level of education reduces the crime rate (Brilli & Tonello 2015). 
As mentioned earlier, the current study uses PMG estimator to analyze the impact of our independent 
variables on the property crime rates. The PMG estimator examines the long run correlation among variables 
across countries by not striking homogeneity of short run parameters based on autoregressive distributed lag 
system (Pesaran et al., 1999). Based on the advantages of PMG mentioned above, this study adopts the PMG of 
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL) modeling approach to establish the long run relationships 
between explanatory variables and explained variables in all objectives. According to Pesaran et al. (1999), the 
long run model as per equation (7) can be derived from the following short run ARDL model: 
       ∑    
 
   
       ∑ ̇   
 
   
              (8) 
 
where t = 1, 2, …., T, is the time period; i = 1, 2, …., N, is the number of countries,     is the (k x 1) vector of 
explanatory  variables  for  a  country i;      are  the  (k x 1)  coefficient  vectors and     represents country fixed  
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effects. The model above can be re-parameterized as a VECM system. Therefore, from equation (8), we can have 
the long run model as per equation (6) above, 
 
                                (9) 
 
with    
  
  ∑    
    
∑    
  ∑    
    
∑    
  ∑    
    
∑    
  ∑    
 
Using the residuals of the long run model, we can also have an error-correction model, 
        ∑            ∑ ̇                          
   
   
   
   
 (10) 
 
where the error-correction term,        , is the residual of the long run model in equation (6) lagged one period, 
 
                    [                    ] (11) 
 
The parameter   is the error-correction parameter implying the speed of adjustment. When     , it 
indicates the non-presence of relationship among variables in the long run. The expected sign of parameter is to 
be negative and significant to insinuate the speed of adjustment or convergence to long run equilibrium. The 
PMG estimator restricts the   element to be identical across countries, under the following assumptions: 
    are independently distributed across i and t with mean 0, variances   
    and finite fourth-order moments. 
They are also distributed independently of the regressors    . The assumption of independence between 
disturbances and regressors is required for consistent estimation of the short run parameters. 
For the long run homogeneity, the long run parameters defined           are the same across the 
countries, namely    and    i = 1, 2, .…, N. Both the country-specific short run parameters and the common long 
run coefficients are computed by a maximum likelihood estimation. The parameters of interest are the long run 
effect and adjustment coefficients. The PMG estimator produces consistent estimates of parameters that are 
asymptotically normal for both stationary and non-stationary I(1) regressors (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, the results of the study findings are explained starting with the results of the summary statistics, 
which is a standard part of this type of longitudinal analysis. The results justify the need to use a heterogeneous 
panel data estimation that permits variations of the short run parameters but restricts the long run coefficients. 
Looking at the minimum and maximum values of crime rates and the independent variables, the standard 
deviations of the variables are recognizable. For example, the standard deviation for crime rates, which is also the 
dependent variable, is 153.08. The minimum and maximum values are 28.13 and 1095.6, respectively. On the 
other hand, the independent variables display the same pattern of variability with the dependent variable. 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable  Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Crime 308 185.49 153.08 28.13 1095.6 
Ineq 308 0.312 0.0502 0.22 0.46 
ROL 282 0.553 0.494 -0.61 1.391 
Imgr 308 5.855 4.568 0.374 17.02 
Educ 308 2.859 0.322 1.943 3.535 
Unem 308 10.305 4.703 3.3 27.3 
Rgdp 304 2.247 3.517 -8.99 10.8 
 Note: Min is minimum, Max is Maximum. 
 
The unit root test revealed that all variables are stationary at first difference (I(1)) using all the tests of 
Levin, Lin and Chu t, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat as well as ADF Fisher. Nevertheless, using ADF Fisher, we 
found that the variables are also stationary at level, I(0). However, the first two tests (Levin,  Lin and  Chu t  and  
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Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat) did not reveal stationary at level, thus, we concluded that the variables are qualified 
for the panel cointegration test. Hence, the majority of the tests showed variables are non-stationary at level. So, 
given the absence of a unit root and the variables being non-spurious at first difference, all variables should be 
considered as integrated of order one (I(1)). The results of the panel unit root at level and at first difference are 
shown in Table 2a and 2b, respectively below. 
 
Table 2a Results of Panel Unit Root Tests                 
Variable                          Statistics Values                          P-values     Conclusion 
 
Crime 
 
 
 
Ineq 
 
 
 
Imgr 
 
 
 
Educ 
 
 
 
Rgdp 
 
 
 
ROL 
 
 
Unem 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                       0.9475 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat           0.2333 
ADF Fisher                                      64.186 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                       1.2321 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat           1.4446 
ADF Fisher                                      45.759 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                      -0.5202 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat          -0.0220 
ADF Fisher                                      47.789 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                       0.2534 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat           1.4083 
ADF Fisher                                      174.09 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t              -4.6423 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat       -3.3043 
ADF Fisher                                      77.852 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                      -0.8881 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat          -2.6432 
ADF Fisher                                      21.184 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                     -2.0530 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat         -1.1734 
ADF Fisher                                     66.689 
0.828               I(1) 
0.592               I(1) 
0.000               I(1) 
 
0.891               I(1) 
0.925               I(1) 
0.018               I(1) 
 
0.300               I(1) 
0.491               I(1) 
0.011               I(1) 
 
0.600               I(1) 
0.920               I(1) 
0.000               I(1) 
 
0.000               I(1) 
0.000               I(1) 
0.000               I(1) 
 
0.187               I(1) 
0.000               I(1) 
0.732               I(1) 
 
0.020               I(1) 
0.120               I(1) 
0.000               I(1) 
 
Table 2b Results of Panel Unit Root Tests                
Variable                       Statistics Values                          P-values     Conclusion 
 
Crime 
 
 
 
Ineq 
 
 
 
Imgr 
 
 
 
Educ 
 
 
 
Rgdp 
 
 
 
ROL 
 
 
Unem 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                       -4.4263 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat           -6.6085 
ADF Fisher                                       97.589 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                       -3.9670 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat           -6.8123 
ADF Fisher                                       100.40 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                       -1.4754 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat           -2.2326 
ADF Fisher                                       42.516 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                      -3.9866 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat          -2.9189 
ADF Fisher                                      60.554 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t              -11.784 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat       -11.488 
ADF Fisher                                      167.09 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                      -6.2019 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat          -5.1930 
ADF Fisher                                      74.587 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu t                      -3.4728 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat          -4.4164 
ADF Fisher                                      67.099 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
 
0.070               I(0) 
0.012               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
 
0.000               I(0) 
0.001               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
0.000               I(0) 
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Table 3 Results of Panel Cointegration Tests 
                                                                          Intercept  
     Test                                        Statistic                P-value             Weighted Statistic                 P-value                                                        
      Within Dimension 
     Panel v-Statistic                      -1.0676      0.8572  -1.52645       0.9366 
     Panel rho-Statistic       3.2014      0.9993   2.89477       0.9981 
     Panel PP-Statistic      -1.8479**      0.0323  -2.67737***                 0.0037 
     Panel ADF-Statistic                -2.7275***      0.0032                 -3.08789***                 0.0010 
 Between Dimension 
     Group rho-Statistic       4.2140      1.0000 
     Group PP-Statistic      -4.0783***      0.0000 
     Group ADF-Statistic               -3.7741***      0.0001 
              Intercept & Trend 
 Within Dimension 
     Panel v-Statistic                     -1.0099      0.8437  -1.73989       0.9591 
     Panel rho-Statistic       3.9467      1.0000   3.88568       0.9999 
     Panel PP-Statistic      -6.4443***      0.0000                 -5.55624***                 0.0000 
     Panel ADF-Statistic                -6.4812***      0.0000  -5.12919***      0.0000 
 Between Dimension 
     Group rho-Statistic       5.1018      1.0000 
     Group PP-Statistic      -11.517***      0.0000 
     Group ADF-Statistic                 -5.8450***      0.0000 
Estimation based on Pedroni Residual Cointegration, N = 14 and T = 22 
   
Table 3 above contains the results of panel cointegration for all the variables in Table 6 based on Pedroni 
residual cointegration. There are seven tests with eleven outcomes and the null hypothesis is that there is no 
cointegration among variables, while the alternative hypothesis is that cointegration does exist among variables. 
Two trend assumptions are made, namely intercept and intercept with trend. Six of the outcomes revealed that the 
variables are cointegrated by having their respective probability values (p-values) less than 0.05. This means that 
the long run relationships exist between independent macroeconomic variables and property crime rates, thus, the 
need to test the long run coefficient using PMG estimator. The null hypothesis is hereby rejected and, therefore, 
we failed rejecting the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Diagnostic Test 
In this study, three different diagnostic tests have been conducted to adequately confirm how valid our dataset is. 
First, we test the variables to confirm whether multicollinearity exists or not. Multicollinearity is a situation in 
which some of the explanatory variables in a multiple regression model became thoroughly correlated to one 
another. This can be detected using variance inflation factor (VIF), if the value of the VIF is less than 4.0, then 
there is no problem of multicollinearity among the variables. Second and third diagnostic tests are conducted to 
check for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems respectively. Table 4 contains the results of the 
multicollinearity test, which reports that there is no multicollinearity problems, hence, the independent variables 
do not correlate with one another in the multiple regression model. This is indicated by having the value of VIF 
less than 10. 
 
Table 4 Results of Multicollinearity 
Model  VIF 1/VIF 
Ineq 2.68 0.372509 
Educ 
ROL 
2.63 
1.39 
0.380680 
0.721999 
Imgr 1.13 0.882011 
Rgdp 1.12 0.889853 
Unem 1.02 0.978321 
Mean VIF 1.72 < 4 No multicollinearity 
Note: VIF is Variance Inflation Factor 
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On the second and third tests, the results have revealed a first order heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
problems. However, these problems have been fixed and the current outcome showed the absence of both 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems. This is indicated by the probability value (P-value) being greater 
than 0.05. The results are presented in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 Results of Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity 
P/Crime Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ineq -0.71082 1.55706 -0.46 0.656 -4.07466 2.65300 
Educ -0.50588 0.59702 -0.85 0.412 -1.79568 0.78391 
Imgr 0.00445 0.03675 -0.12 0.905 -0.07494 0.08385 
Rgdp -0.02666 0.01673 -1.59 0.135 -0.06283 0.00949 
Unem 0.02736 0.02714 1.01 0.332 -0.03128 0.08601 
Rol 0.47351 0.27977 1.69 0.114 -0.13090 1.07793 
Note: P-values greater than 0.05, which means no autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems 
 
As mentioned earlier, 14 countries in the Southern and Eastern European regions were used in this study. 
The results of the PMG estimator are presented in Table 6 below. It reports the estimated results of the effect of 
income inequality on the property crime rate (objective of the study). Instead of Mean Group (MG), the study 
used PMG estimator which restricts all long run coefficients to be homogeneous while permitting dynamics in 
the short run coefficients. This can yield lesser standard errors and then improves significantly the speed of 
adjustment measure with a negative sign of the estimated coefficients of the long run. Furthermore, the long run 
homogeneity restriction imposed for all slope coefficients is hereby accepted at the predictable level of Hausman 
test statistics. The restriction of the long run coefficients to be homogenous affected both the sign and the 
significance level of the long run coefficients, as revealed by the estimated results.   
 
Table 6 Results of the Long run Estimations 
     Long run Model                                             Column 1                             Column 2                              Column 3 
 Ineq    -0.159   1.148**                   0.141*** 
     (0.605)   (0.514)   (0.035) 
 ROL    ---------   -1.220***  -0.652*** 
        (0.404)   (0.162) 
 Educ    2.293*   6.317***                  -0.708*** 
     (1.209)   (1.447)   (0.360) 
 Unem    0.434***                   0.408***  0.047*** 
     (0.087)   (0.109)   (0.007) 
 Imgr    0.011   -0.341***  -0.056*** 
     (0.027)   (0.066)   (0.019) 
 Rgdp    0.073***                  0.097***                 -0.030*** 
     (0.018)   (0.014)   (0.006) 
 Ineq*ROL   --------   --------   -0.203*** 
     --------   --------   (0.033) 
 ECM    -0.300***  -0.171***  -0.415*** 
     (0.091)   (0.063)   (0.189) 
 HLH    0.9992   0.9992   0.7695 
 Observation   252   252   268 
 Countries   14   14   14 
Note: ECT= Error correction term; HLH= Hausman long run homogeneity; ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively; standard errors in (), Lag selection: ARDL (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1), selected based on AIC. 
 
In Table 6 above, column 3 revealed that in the long run, the income inequality and rule of law positively 
and negatively affect the level of property crime rate in the 14 Southern and Eastern European countries, 
respectively. A 1 percent increase in the income inequality will trigger a 0.141 percent increase in the property 
crime rate, while a 1 percent increase in the quality of rule of law decreases the property crime rate by 0.652 
percent. The relationships are significant at a 1 percent level. The unemployment rate is found to have a positive 
effect on the property crime rate in these regions. In the long run, a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate 
will have a 0.047 percent increase in the rate of property crime victims. In the same column 3, the interaction of 
income inequality and rule of law shows a negative relationship with the property crime, which suggests that the 
income inequality will not affect the property crime rate in which there is a strong rule of law.  
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The long run positive relationship identified by this study between income inequality and property crime 
is in line with the expectations of the study. Meanwhile, the theoretical expectation on the relationship between 
rule of law and crime rate is that the rule of law tends to reduce the rate of crime, and so, the long run negative 
impact of the rule of law on the property crime revealed by this study is in line with the expectations of the study. 
This suggests that the income inequality in Europe, particularly, in the southern and eastern parts induces the 
property crime rate as those hit by the inequality would seek for compensation by all means, while a strong rule 
of law reduces the property crime rate in the regions. Moreover, the degree of their effects are quite reasonable 
and meaningful. The long run positive and significant effect of unemployment revealed in this study conformed 
to the expectations of the study and the findings of Ishak and Bani (2017), Brenner (1979), and the findings of 
Huhta (2012). This means that as more and more people became unemployed, they tend to think of a way of 
earning income illegally.  
The real GDP per capita growth rate’s coefficient reports a positive impact on the property crime rate. The 
result contradicts the expectation of this study. However, the positive effect of economic growth on crime may be 
possible through the income distribution; if the benefits from growth are not evenly distributed, it can have a 
negative effect on the distribution of income. This will enlarge the level of income inequality and in turn, induces 
the crime rate. The interactive term of income inequality and rule of law as specified in equation (7) of this study 
reports a negative and significant impact on the property crime rates. This means that in the presence of strong 
quality of the rule of law, the income inequality impacts less on the property crime. It estimates the effect of 
income inequality when the quality of the rule of law in these regions is strong. The error correction term (ECT) 
for the estimates is negative and significant and the Hausman test is greater than 0.05, which rendered the 
estimation of the pooled mean group (PMG) valid. 
In the estimation, the PMG estimator controls the problem of endogenous regressors that are within the 
framework of ARDL models, especially if the regressors are I(1). Pesaran et al. (1999) and Golem and Perovic 
(2014) have also lamented the fact that the PMG estimator controls the endogeneity problem. In spite of these 
evidences, a diagnostic check is conducted by this study using Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) 
estimator; the results of the estimate are expected to have the same long-run coefficients’ sign with the PMG 
estimate and are also expected to be significant. If the DOLS estimate corresponds with that of the PMG, then the 
issue of endogeneity and autocorrelation is hereby addressed. This is because the endogeneity problem will be 
taken care of automatically by the DOLS estimator. The results of the diagnostic checks are presented below with 
the property crime as the dependent variable. 
Table 6  Results of the Robustness Check 
             Long Run Model                                                       Long run Coefficients (DOLS) 
                                                                                                                 Lead=1       Lag=1 
   Ineq      5.488** 
        (2.252) 
  ROL      -0.602** 
        (0.258) 
  Educ      -5.658*** 
        (1.964) 
  Unem      0.268*** 
        (0.053) 
  Imgr      -0.734*** 
        (0.248) 
  Rgdp      -0.009* 
        (0.005) 
  Ineq*ROL     -0.169** 
        (0.073) 
Note: Values in Parenthesis (()) are Standard Errors, Dependent Variable: Property crime 
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The above estimated results of the DOLS for the effects of the independent variables on the property 
crime rate agreed with the estimated results of the PMG in Table 3, model three in column 3 above. Therefore, an 
inference is hereby drawn that there is an absence of endogeneity problem in the regressors. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The foremost objective of this paper is to examine the effects of income inequality on the property crime rate in 
14 (mostly emerging) Southern and Eastern European countries by using a pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. 
The study incorporates the rule of law and interacts with the income inequality to further explain the relationship 
between income inequality and property crime. Other variables like unemployment, level of education, and 
immigrant status were also considered as independent variables. The results of the findings provide an evidence 
of the existence of the long run relationship between property crime and most of the explanatory variables. First, 
the results confirm the general strain theory that high level of income inequality induces the crime rate; the 
positive relationship between income inequality and property crime remains significant across the 14 sampled 
Southern and Eastern European countries. The beliefs of the people affected by income differences is that 
committing crime is the only workable way to seek compensation of the deprivation. Secondly, the rule of law 
proves the apriori expectation of this study that a strong rule of law reduces the property crime level, and it is also 
in line with the theory that a strong rule of law has the tendency to protect lives and property including property 
rights. While a poor quality of rule of law shrinks the trust of the people on the government (Harrison and 
Rodriguez, 2009). The interaction of income inequality and rule of law shows a negative relationship and this 
further explains that with a strong rule of law, the income inequality will have less positive impact on the 
property crime in Southern and Eastern Europe. The unemployment and level of education respectively affect the 
property crime positively and negatively. 
The recommendations that have been drawn regarding the results of our study are, first of all, not 
permitting us to make a sweeping statement on other regions of the world as the data and the sample size is 
limited to only 14 Southern and Eastern European countries. It is suggested, therefore, that studies on other 
regions are hereby recommended. It is also important to note that this study does not allow us to come to a certain 
conclusion about the cause and effect; we assume reasonably that the income inequality and rule of law are not 
mainly triggered by the property crime. Furthermore, the need to halt the recent increase in the income inequality 
and effort to reduce its effects is highly recommended. Strengthening the quality of rule of law is helpful, and, 
based on its additional mitigating relationship to the property crime is also recommended. Lastly, the provision 
for job opportunities to reduce unemployment is hereby recommended by this study. These actions will serve as a 
way towards reducing the rate of property crime in these countries. 
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